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THE FINAL ACT OF THE
HELSINKI CONFERENCE:
AN ARTISTS'
LIBERATION MOVEMENT OR A
VOYAGE TO LAPUTA?
JAMES A. R. NAFZIGER
THE FINAL AcT OF THE Conference on Security and Co-Operation in
Europe,' often referred to as the "Helsinki Accords," has important
implications for art and artists. Although the document has no legally
binding effect, it is nevertheless a morally compelling, comprehensive expres-
sion of norms which are intended to guide, if not govern, sovereign behavior
in Europe. 2 It serves, too, as a leading symbol of East-West detente.
Signatories of the Final Act, which include the United States, Canada, and
all European countries except Albania,3 pledge themselves to cooperate in
further efforts to establish a method for the peaceful settlement of disputes,
including a Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes.4
The Final Act contains three "Baskets." The first of these concerns
"Questions relating to Security in Europe" establishing a "Declaration on
[Ten] Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States"; the second
treats "Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology
and of the Environment"; and Basket III, with which this Article is primarily
concerned, is entitled "Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields." 5 A
* B.A., M.A., Univ. of Wisconsin; J.D., Harvard Law School; Member, Wisconsin Bar; Assoc.
Professor of Law, Willamette Univ. College of Law; Visiting Professor (Fulbright), National
Autonomous Univ. of Mexico (1978).
1 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 73
DEP'T STATE BULL. 323 (1975), 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1292 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Final Act].
2 See Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput? 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242,246-
49 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Russell]. On the subject of human rights and the Helsinki Accords,
see generally HUMAN RIGH-s, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD (T. Buergenthal ed.
1978). Although the document contains language of legal obligation, its status is clarified by the
provision that: "The Government of the Republic of Finland is requested to transmit to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations the text of this Final Act, which is not eligible for
registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. ... Follow-up to the
Conference, Final Act, supra note 1 at 349, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1325. Under Article 102 of the
United Nations Charter, a registration facility is provided for treaties and other international
agreements, but not for international arrangements lacking binding legal force. See also
Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L.
296,304 (1977).
3 The European signatories were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and
Yugoslavia. Canada and the United States also signed the Accords.
4 Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Final Act, supra note 1, at 327,14 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
at 1297.
See, Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearings on the Implementation of
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concluding procedural section, "Follow-up to the Conference," is sometimes
regarded as a fourth basket.
The Final Act articulates principles not only of intergovernmental rela-
tions and cooperation, but also of individual human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Akin to an international agreement, the concluding section,
"Follow-up to the Conference," requires the signatories to "pay due regard
to and implement the provisions"6 of the accords unilaterally, bilaterally, and
multilaterally. The same section establishes a continuing multilateral review
process centering on a thorough exchange of views and periodic high level
meetings. 7
Much public attention has been devoted to several significant features of
the Final Act: a recognition of the inviolability of national frontiers; a
commitment to disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes; a
resolution favoring the reunification of families; and the commitment to
individual human rights and fundamental freedoms. Less attention has been
given until recently to a number of provisions of Baskets II and III, including
those in Basket III calling for "Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of
Culture," which together with the explicitly enunciated human rights and
follow-up provisions, are of special concern to the art community.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINAL ACT FOR
ART AND ARTISTS
The Final Act applies to three broad categories of art law issues: cultural
cooperation and exchange of cultural material; the rights of individual artists;
the Helsinki Accords Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 95th Cong.
1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The significance of Basket III is summarized as
follows in Russell, supra note 2, at 243:
It is Basket III, and in particular the human contacts and information texts, dealing with
meetings between family members on the basis of family ties and reunification of
divided families; marriage between citizens of different states; travel for personal or
professional reasons; improvement of the circulation of, access to, and exchange of oral,
printed, filmed, and broadcast information; and improved conditions for journalists,
that were of greatest interest to the West and may have the most influence on future
events.
6 Final Act, supra note 1, at 348, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1324.
7 Specifically, the Final Act, Follow-up to the Conference, expresses in section two the resolve
of the signatories to continue the process initiated by the Conference:
(a) by proceeding to a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of
the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, in
the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of their mutual
relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe,
and the development of the process of detente in the future;
(b) by organizing to these ends meetings among their representatives, beginning
with a meeting at the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs ...
3. The first of the meetings indicated above will be held at Belgrade in 1977 ...
Id. at 348-49, 14 IrNr'L LEGAL MAT. at 1325. The first follow-up meeting was held as scheduled.
See, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 7,1977, at 6, col. 1; Belgrade Meeting Following Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Selection of Documents Illustrating the Negotiations of
the Belgrade Meeting. 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1206 (1978). For excerpts from the opening remarks
of the United States delegation to this meeting, see 72 Am. J. of Int'l. L. 120 (1978). The second
review meeting is scheduled to take place in Madrid in 1980. 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1206 (1978).
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and other international cooperation. This study will examine each of these
categories in the context of a current or recent problem, consider pertinent
provisions of the Final Act, and conclude with a brief recommendation and
forecast.
A. Cultural Cooperation and Exchange of
Cultural Material
The free flow of cultural material serves two major functions: the enrich-
ment of human experience, both for the artist and others; and the facilitation
of international understanding. These functions are inhibited by two factors:
authoritarian cultural and ideological sensitivities, such as the well-known
Soviet restrictions on artistic expression and international trade in art; and
state-centrist inhibitions on the flow of material, such as export-import
prohibitions, restrictions, regulations, and fees. The Final Act addresses both
of these factors. In doing so, it builds upon a long history of attempts to
define an international regime to protect and regulate the transnational media
in all its forms.8 A prominent element in this effort is paragraph 8 of the
"Essentials of Peace" Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly: "to
remove the barriers which deny to peoples the free flow of information and
ideas essential to international understanding and peace."9
The Final Act, which explicitly recognizes the role of cultural exchanges
and cooperation in promoting "a lasting understanding among states,"'10
expresses the "intention" to implement five objectives:
(a) to develop the mutual exchange of information with a view to a
better knowledge of respective cultural achievements,
(b) to improve the facilities for the exchange and for the
dissemination of cultural property,
(c) to promote access by all to respective cultural achievements,
(d) to develop contacts and co-operation among persons active in
the field of culture,
(e) to seek new fields and forms of cultural co-operation."
The Final Act catalogues a variety of means to facilitate these objectives:
bilateral and multilateral loan and exchange agreements; meetings of artists
and cultural experts; book fairs; exchanges of information; joint efforts to
conserve, restore and show art; transnational educational exchanges; and
recognition in national policy of the cultural needs and interests of other
states. The Final Act recognizes the cultural contributions of migrant
workers, national minorities, and regional cultures, and provides that these
groups should be included in cooperative programs.' 2
8 See M. Whiteman, 13 DIc. Ir'r'L L. 903 (1968).
9 G.A. Res. 290 (IV), U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 13 (1949).
10 Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, Final Act, supra note 1 at 343, 14 INrr'L
LEGAL MAT. at 1317.
11 Id. at 343, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1318. These objectives are based upon the 1966
UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation. See Dass,
European Co-operation and UNESCO, 22 UNESCO CHRON. 278 (1976).
12 Final Act, supra note 1 at 343, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1318.
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An important characteristic of Basket III of the Final Act is its emphasis on
removing financial, regulatory, and other restrictions on the international flow
of cultural property. There is a tension between the interests of collectors,
museums, and transcultural education which favor an increase in this flow,
and the countervailing desire to preserve the integrity of national patrimo-
nies. 13 One congenial means of reducing this tension would be to provide for
extended loans and exchanges of redundant materials. Inter-museum and
inter-governmental agreements can be used to formalize such transnational
cooperation. Within the East-West context, a well-known example is the
loaning to United States museums of both traditional and Impressionist art
from the Soviet Union.14
Of more than passing importance to lawyers in this regard are three
provisions under the Basket III sub-heading, "Exchanges and Dissemination."
This portion of the Final Act commits the signatories:
To contribute to the improvement of facilities for exchanges and
the dissemination of cultural property, by appropriate means, in
particular by:
- studying the possibilities for harmonizing and reducing the
charges relating to international commercial exchanges of books and
other cultural materials, and also for new means of insuring works of
art in foreign exhibitions and for reducing the risks of damage or loss
to which these works are exposed by their movement;
-facilitating the formalities of customs clearance, in good time
for programmes of artistic events, of the works of art, materials and
accessories appearing on lists agreed upon by the organizers of these
events;
-endeavouring to ensure the full and effective application of the
international agreements and conventions on copyrights and on
circulation of cultural property to which they are party or to which
they may decide in the future to become party. 5
The first two of these provisions address serious inhibitions on the flow of
loaned or exchanged material. The third is a rather pointed response to the
problems of non-recognition of copyrights and ideological restrictions on the
flow of foreign cultural property by socialist states.
The Final Act goes beyond the garden-variety problems encountered in
encouraging the transnational movement of cultural property, for it commits
13 For an example of the international dimensions of this problem, see Nafziger, Controlling
the Northward Flow of Mexican Antiquities, 7 LAW. AM. 68 (1975) which discusses questions of
law and policy in connection with the international art trade.
DuBoff ed. 1975), which discusses questions of law and policy in connection with the internatioal
art trade.
14 For a brief commentary on private agreements between or among museums, concerning
especially the United States and Mexico, see Nafziger, Regulation by the International Council of
Museums: An Example of the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Transnational
Legal Process, 2 DEN. J. INTL L. & POL'y 231,239-40 (1972).
15 Co-operation In Humanitarian and Other Fields, Final Act, supra note 1 at 344, 14 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. at 1318-19.
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states to facilitate the flow of even that cultural property which may be
ideologically or culturally dissonant to them. This intent is manifest, for
example, in the confirmation of "active participation of the broadest possible
social groups in an increasingly diversified cultural life,"' 6 the declared
disposition of participating states "to increase substantially their cultural
exchanges,"' 7 the conviction that the development of mutual relations among
them will contribute to the reinforcement "of a consciousness of common
values," and the expressed intention "to promote fuller mutual access by all
to the achievements . . . in the various fields of culture of their countries,
and to that end to make the best possible efforts."'19
A test case of these provisions relates to the efforts of the Soviet Union to
force the cancellation of the 1977 Biennale in Venice, on the theme of dissident
art and culture in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union threatened an Eastern
European boycott of the 1977 and future Biennale festivals, using its diplo-
matic leverage against the Italian government, which subsidizes the festival.
Carlo Ripa de Meana, the festival director, responded as follows to both the
Soviet government's threat and the apparent willingness of the Italian
government to yield to that threat:
This year's festival theme is not a political sensation but a
profound documentation and analysis of one of the most important
phenomena of contemporary culture. The spirit of Helsinki [the
Helsinki declaration of 1975 on East-West detente] cannot mean
silence for an institution like the Biennale. It would risk its credibili-
ty to pretend that nothing had happened and reject the culture of
dissent. 20
The earlier identified provisions of the Final Act explicitly support this
interpretation of the document's "spirit." The strong resistance to Soviet
pressures by the Director of the Biennale succeeded. The.political controver-
sy became diffused and less intense; the 1977 theme - "Dissent in the
Countries of Eastern Europe" - was retained; and the Biennale took place, as
a "protest against the insanity of politics and the suppression of art" by means
of a "crude exportation of Soviet censorship."2' The Soviet actions, in clear
violation of the Final Act's commitment to more open cultural exchanges, thus
failed to daunt the integrity of the art community.
B. The Rights of Individual Artists
The restrictions imposed on artistic freedom by a number of signatory
16 Id. at 343, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1317.
17 Id.
is Id. at 343, 14 INT'L LECAL MAT. at 1318.
19 Id. at 344, 14 INT'L LFGAL MAT. at 1319.
20 Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 9, 1977, at 9, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1977, at 3, col. 1.
21 See Hughes, Art Versus Politics At The Venice Biennale, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1977 at II, 29,
col. 3 ("Venice is sinking no more, at least in spirit"); letter from Mirella Alterocca Hemp,
Consolato Generale d'Italia (San Francisco) to the author (June 9, 1977); letter from Alfred
Friendly, Jr., Deputy Staff Director, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to the
author (August 23, 1977); Via al rilancio della Biennale, II Popolo, June 3, 1977. On the Soviet
response to the Venice Biennale, see, Excelsior [Mexico], Nov. 18, 1977, at El, col. 1.
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states are notorious,2 2 and the grievances of dissident artists residing in those
countries have been well publicized. Although these claims of repression
might be regarded as purely domestic matters, the Final Act correlates
individual human rights and fundamental freedoms with the aims of interna-
tional harmony and security which animate the document. Individual
freedom, defined by international standards, is to be an important element in
implementing the Helsinki spirit.
Aside from those protections of artists which are implicit in the Basket III
provisions for international cultural cooperation and exchange, the human
rights provisions contained in Basket I of the Final Act are also important for
artists. Specifically, the participating states agreed to promote and encour-
age the effective exercise of fundamental individual rights and freedoms, "all
of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are
essential for his free and full development."23 Further, participating states
"confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties
in this field."24 The signatories also agree to act in conformity with the
"purposes and principles" of the United Nations Charter, the' Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and, if they are parties to them, the Internation-
al Covenants on Human Rights. 25  In addition, parties to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
of November 4, 1952,26 that is, most of the Western European countries, are
bound by its provisions and prescribed institutional framework.
Article 56 of the United Nations Charter requires all members to "pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the [United
Nations] for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."27 Article
55 of the Charter, building upon Article 1(3), requires the United Nations,
inter alia, to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion." 28 These rights and freedoms are further defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 29 which many view as the best evidence of the
22 For recent examples of artistic repression, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1976, § C, at 18,.co.l;
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1977, at 6, col. 1; Starr, Soviet Painter Poses a Question, 8 SMITHSONIAN, Dec.
1977, at 101 (on Soviet censorship of Ilia Glazunov's "The Mystery of the Twentieth Century," a
mural which is itself somewhat of a mystery). Andrei D. Sakharov delivered a message to the
1977 Venice Biennale which spoke of "the complete tragedy of creative life in the East." N.Y.
Times, Dec. 4, 1977, at II, 29, col. 3. See also Leary, The Implementing of the Human Rights
Provisions of the Helsinki Act, A Preliminary Assessment: 1975-1977, in HUMAN RIcHrS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AccoPD (T. Buergenthal ed. 1978) at 148-50.
23 Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Final Act, supra note 1 at 325, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
at 1295.
24 Id.
25 Id. There will remain some uncertainty as to how broadly the phrase "purposes and
principles" is to be construed. Russell, supra note 2 at 262. The Eastern European countries,
unlike the Western European and North American countries, seem inclined to employ the phrase
to restrict the applicable United Nations Charter provisions to Articles 1 and 2. Even so, Article
1(3) of the Charter establishes humanitarian and human rights aims of the United Nations which,
to be given any effect, must be respected and implemented by Member States.
26 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,1952,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955).
27 U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
28 U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
29 G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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customary international law of human rights and as an inteipretation of the
more general human rights provisions contained in the United Nations
Charter. 30 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration guarantees everyone "the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. '31 Although the
freedom protected is susceptible to a narrow construction, excluding artistic
opinion or expression, the phrase "through any media" suggests a meaning
that includes the arts.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,32 to which the
Social Union and a number of other European States are parties, is also
applicable. That agreement represents the culmination of a long effort to
translate the aspirations and norms of the Charter and the Universal Declara-
tion into more precise, binding law. The Covenant is very specific about the
right of artistic expression. Article 19(2) states that: "Everyone shall have the
right to freedom of expression; the right shall include freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of froptiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice."33
Despite its specific reference to art, this Covenant may be considerably
more difficult to apply for the benefit of the art world than the more general
language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This paradox
results from an escape-clause in the Covenant not present in the Universal
Declaration. Accordingly, exercise of the right protected by Article 19
"carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject
to certain restrictions, but these shall be only as are provided by law and are
necessary, (1) for the national security, (2) for respect of the rights and
reputations of others or of public order ("ordre public"), or of public health or
morals."34 These qualifications seem to provide ample support for restrictive
practices imposed in the name of public order, national security, or health and
morals. If the rights of individual, often politically dissident artists are to be
protected, a strong emphasis must be placed on pouring specific content into
the substantive right of free expression. True progress can be made only if
further agreement is reached on minimum standards of artistic freedom,
exempt from the domestic police power.
C. Other International Cooperation
The Final Act not only provides that participating states must conform
30 See V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY 120-25
(1970) and J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 9-15 (1970), which
summarize various viewpoints regarding the legal significance of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, as well as its binding nature upon the signatories.
1 G.A. Res. 217 (III), art. 19, supra note 29 (emphasis added).
32 Adopted and opened for Signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), updated in [1976] MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN
RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL PERFoRMS DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS, LIST OF SIGNATURES,
RATIFICATIONS, ACCESSIONS, ETC. as at 31 December 1976, at 101, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/10.
33 Id., art. 19 (emphasis added).
34 Id.
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their behavior to international law and standards, but also that they must
operate within a specified international organizational framework. This
requirement has important implications for the United States and for the
vitality of Basket III.
Although the first principle of Basket I of the Final Act establishes that
participating states "have the right to belong or not to belong to international
organizations, '" 35 the signatories nevertheless pledge in the "follow-up" sec-
tion of the document to implement its provisions unilaterally, bilaterally, and
multilaterally. Their specific commitment to operate "multilaterally
. . .within the framework of existing international organizations, such as the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and UNESCO"3 6 bears
examination. Specific mention of only two international organizations
indicates the importance which the Final Act attaches to participation in them
by the Helsinki signatories. If this intent of the Final Act is to be respected,
the United States must reassume full participation in UNECO and assume
new obligations under the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property ("UNESCO Convention"). 3
The withdrawal of United States support for UNESCO, related to the
effective muffling of an Israeli voice in the organization, has been examined
elsewhere.38  So has the failure of the United States Congress to adopt
legislation to implement the UNESCO Convention,3 9 even though in 1972 the
Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention by a vote
of 79 to 0.4o Congressional failure to implement the legislation is an expres-
sion both of its hostility toward UNESCO,4' and its more general paralysis in
the face of pluralistic pressure and competing legislative demands. 42 The
Final Act makes a substantial contribution by imposing a moral obligation
upon the United States to recommit itself to the advancement of cultural
cooperation within the framework of UNESCO and its international agree-
ments. The United States should welcome the opportunity to work from
within this framework, however hostile it may sometimes be.
I1. THE DURABILITY OF THE FINAL AcT
It is still too early to judge what lasting effects the Final Act will have, much
less how Basket III may be affected by developments related to Baskets I and
II. Inasmuch as the Final Act does not legally bind its signatories, its impact
will be determined by their unilateral, good faith commitment and by public
-5 Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Final Act, supra note 1, at 324, 14 INT LEGAL
MAT, at 1294.
36 Follow-up to the Conference, Final Act, supra note 1 at 348, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1324.
37 Done Nov. 14, 1970, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 289 (1971).
s Nafziger, UNESCO-Centered Management of International Conflict Over Cultural Prop-
erty, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1051 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Nafziger].
11 DuBoff, Nafziger, Emmerich, Feldman, McAlee, & Bator, Proceedings of the Panel on the
U.S. Enabling Legislation of the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 4 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & CoNvM. 97 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Panel Proceedings].
40 See id. at 102.
41 See Nafziger, supra note 38, at 1054 n. 15.
42 See Panel Proceedings, supra note 39 passim.
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opinion. It has been stated that "Basket III remains the main source of
contention and the main measure of progress, since it requires positive action
from the signatories."4 3 The scoreboard thus far reflects both implementa-
tion and relation.44 Whatever the "score," it appears that, on the whole, the
Final Act is being taken seriously by its signatories and has provided a useful
set of standards for both international and domestic application.
The Final Act is being taken seriously by the signatories primarily because
they have an important stake in its success. Both spheres of influence in
Europe obtained what they wanted. The Soviet sphere got the Conference,
the Act itself, and the ten principles of interstate relations contained in Basket
I. The Western bloc got the express agreement of the Warsaw Pact countries
to balanced force reductions in Europe, the inclusion of the
United States and Canada in the Conference, a number of other diplomatic
concessions outside the scope of the Conference and Basket 111.45
The Soviet Union vigorously resisted the inclusion'of Basket III provisions
in the Final Act.4 6 The Western passion for these provisions arose out of guilt
concerning generous post-war settlements, the prospect of liberalizing East-
ern Europe, and a genuine perception of linkage between Basket III and
security, the raison d'etre of the Conference. When the Soviet Union became
convinced that its opposition to Basket III was a losing battle, it began a
rearguard action to weaken that Basket by embodying two propositions in the
Final Act: first, that the free flow of information objective of Basket III was to
be subordinate to the overriding aim of the Conference of friendly and good-
neighbourly relations; and second, that Basket III more generally was to be
subordinate to the Basket I provisions regarding sovereignty and noninterven-
tion.
The nonintervention provision of Basket 1,17 however, does not appear to
apply to human rights and Basket III concerns. Although this provision
extends beyond "armed intervention" and "terrorist activities" to
condemn "political, economic or other coercion,"48 few would seriously argue
43 Davy, Helsinki Scoreboard, 32 THE WORLD TODAY 280 (1976).
44 Id. at 281; see Hearings, supra note 5.
45 Davy, The CSCE Summit, 31 THE WORLD TODAY 349 (1975).
46 Id. at 351.
41 Final Act, Questions Relating to Security in Europe, § 1(a) provides in part:
VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs
The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect,
individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic
jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.
They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such
intervention against another participating State.
They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of
political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the
exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus
to secure advantages of any kind.
Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist
activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of
the regime of another participating State.
Final Act, supra note 1 at 325, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1294-95.
18 See note 47 supra.
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that diplomatic pressures to enhance human rights involve acts of coercion.
It is established, moreover, that the pursuit and protection of human rights,
particularly under Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter, do not
constitute intervention into the "domestic jurisdiction" of states.49
The sovereignty provision of Basket I, formally captioned "Sovereign
equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty," requires each signato-
ry to respect "each other's .. .right to determine its laws and regulations." 50
This apparently innocuous language is the result of a compromise between
the Soviet and Western positions on the significance of Basket l1.5" On one
hand, the provision enables the Soviet Union to argue that its municipal law
prevails in cases of conflict with Basket III. On the other hand, a second
provision in Basket I, designed to counter the Soviet argument establishes that
the signatories,
in exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine
their laws and regulations . ..will conform with their legal obliga-
tions under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard
to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe.52
Soviet proposals, designed to subordinate Basket III to Basket I principles
of nonintervention and sovereignty, were couched in caveats of respect for
the "laws and regulations" or the "cultural systems" of other states53 and in a
narrow definition of protected information flow. 54 A stipulation was also
inserted in the preamble to Basket III stating that "cooperation should take
place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participat-
ing states." 55 Basket I, however, also provides that "[a]ll of the principles"
within the Declaration "are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will
be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking
into account the others."5 6 Thus, "full respect" for the principles in Basket I
includes respect for its provisions regarding human rights and fundamental
freedoms, which in turn serve to strengthen Basket III provisions for "freer
movement and contacts"5 7 among persons. Moreover, other language within
19 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7 provides in part that: "Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state .. " This is generally interpreted, principally by United
Nations practice in response to issues of discrimination and apartheid, to allow international
review of human rights questions. See Fawcett, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, in
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RicHrs 286 (E. Luard ed. 1967).
50 Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Final Act, supra note 1 at 324,14 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
at 1293.
51 Russell, supra note 2, at 263.
52 Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Final Act, supra note 1 at 326,14 INTL LEGAL MAT.
at 1296.
5 Id. at 324, 14 INTL LEGAL MAT. at 1293.
54 Id. at 326, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1295.
55 Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, Preamble, Final Act, supra note 1 at 339,14
INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1313.
51 Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Final Act, supra note 1 at 326,14 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
at 1296.
5" Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, Final Act, supra note 1 at 339, 14 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. at 1313.
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the Basket I declaration of principles can be read to strengthen Basket 111.58
Thus, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union or any other signatory of the Final
Act will be able to limit Basket III provisions by recourse to the "full
respect for the principles" clause.
III. A RECOMMENDATION AND A FORECAST
The Final Act was designed to be an agreement among all the signatory
states, and not to establish relationships among political spheres of influence.
Nevertheless, basic disagreements as to how the instrument should be
construed find Eastern European states on one side, and the North Atlantic
states on the other.59 The Eastern European states, most notably the Soviet
Union, seek to subordinate what they view as the "soft" provisions of Basket
III to the "hard" provisions of Basket I. At the same time, however, the Final
Act embodies provisions and principles of great importance to the Soviet
Union. The Helsinki Conference "was a coveted Soviet project for some 20
years. "60 The Soviet Union regards the Final Act as a great diplomatic victory,
and it would be a diplomatic defeat for it if the Act were to fall into desuetude
or disrepute. Hence the Soviet dilemma is to find a means of avoiding the
distasteful provisions of Basket III, without thereby undermining the entire
document.6'
In view of the high stakes, the Final Act possesses the force of lex ferenda
in the sense, for example, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights prior
to the adoption of the two United Nations covenants on human rights. Even
-8 For example, the principle of "Co-operation Among States" requires "accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" and confirms that "governments,
institutions and persons have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing toward the
achievement of these aims of cooperation." Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Final Act,
supra note 1 at 326, 14 INT'L LECAL MAT. at 1295-96 (emphasis added).
59 For a commentary on the Soviet position, see Osnos, Carter-Kremlin Showdown at
Belgrade on Human Rights, Guardian Weekly, June 19, 1977, at 15, col. 1; Lvov, In the Second
Post Helsinki Year, NEW TIMEs, January, 1977, at 6; Yaroslavtsev, Basis of European Security,
INT'L AFFAIRS [Moscow] (no. 5) 13 (1976); Lvov, The European Conference: Experience and
Significance, INT'L AFFAIRS [Moscow] (no. 4) 41 (1976); Chernenko, The Conference in Helsinki
and International Security, INT'L AFFAIRS [Moscow] (no. 11) 3 (1975). See also almost any issue
after 1974 of THE WORLD MARxIST REVIEW. On the somewhat variant positions of the non-Soviet
countries of Eastern Europe, see Six Months After: The East European Response to Helsinki, 14
ATLANTIC COMMUNITY Q., Spring 1976, at 59, 60; Grela, The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 15 POLISH W. AFF. 237 (1974). For the Western European viewpoint, see
Henze, Neue Aufgaben der Entspannungspolitik; Freizigigkeit und verbesserte Information-
smdglichkeit als Ziele der KSZE, 30 EUROPA ARcI-iv 567 (1975); Galtung, European Security and
Co-operation, 12 J. PEACE RESEARCH 165 (1975). The United States' position and interpretation
of the Final Act as expressed by President Ford may be found in Helsinki Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe, The President's Remarks to the Conference in Finlandia
Hall, 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 809 (Aug. 1, 1975).
60 Russell, supra note 2, at 244. The author concludes that
The Basket III texts, not discussed in this article, incorporate into the agenda of detente
human rights and concepts of freedom of movement and information which clearly
favor the Western view of interstate relations. Although replete with loopholes, the
Basket III texts will remain a diplomatic problem for the Eastern bloc for many years
to come. Having acknowledged the desirability of these concepts in one of their
favorite international documents, these governments will continue to be embarrased if
they have not taken steps toward their realization.
Id. at 272.
61 See NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 1975, at 6.
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so, given the Soviet position on the relationship between Baskets I and III,
continuing efforts to strengthen linkage among the Baskets is necessary. It is
recommended that specific efforts be directed toward establishing authorita-
tively that no Basket is to be considered more definitive of the underlying
"spirit of Helsinki" than another. Otherwise, the art world will not obtain the
full benefits of Basket III.
The Final Act of the Helsinki Conference may not swiftly ignite an
artists' liberation movement throughout Europe. It is clear, nevertheless, that
its Baskets contain more than cucumbers for extracting sunbeams to warm the
occasionally chilly air of d6tente. Keeping the Baskets together will assist the
transnational movement of art and artists, and thereby may prove the Final
Act to be more than a voyage to Laputa.6 2
62 Harold S. Russell's reference to Swift inspired this metaphor. Russell, supra note 2, at272.
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